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Abstract 
This study examines the effect of intercity transportation and communications infrastructure 
on urban concentration on a sample of 84 countries between the years 1960 and 2010. By 
comparing the effects of interregional transportation and communications infrastructure on 
primacy and urbanization, I find that (1) such investments promote population lspersion 
amongst connected areas and (2) population concentration from unconnected locations into 
connected ones. Therefore, intercity transportation and communications infrastructure is 
only effective at reducing excessive concentration when the lspersion effect exceeds the 
concentration effect. 
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1. Introduction 
The increase in the level of urbanization worldwide over the past century is 
unstoppable, from a 13% of the world's population living in urban areas in 1900 to over a 
50% in 2006 (United Nations World Urbanization Prospects, 2005; Cohen 2005). For the 
first time in history, most people in the world live in cities or towns, and if thts trend 
continues, in 2050 the urban population d reach a remarkable 70% (United Nations World 
Urbanization Prospects, 2005). T h s  relentless trend towards urbanization has been 
commonly referred to as the arrival of the "urban d e n n i u m "  (United Nations World 
Urbanization Prospects, 2005). Such rapid urban growth is fundamentally driven by the 
transformation of countries' economies from agricultural activities into increasingly 
industrial and service-based activities, whch are much more efficient in close spatial 
proximity (Davis and Henderson, 2003). However, agglomeration of economic activity 
increases efficiency only to a degree, because at some point the costs of htgher rental prices 
and congestion in high-density locations outweigh the benefits of low transportation costs 
(Davis and Henderson, 2003). 
The urban economics literature finds that there is a systematic tendency across 
countries to underestimate the costs of agglomeration, which leads to excessive 
concentration in large urban areas, particularly in the largest city (Ades and Glaeser, 1995; 
Henderson & Becker, 2000; Duranton and Puga, 2003; Davis and Henderson, 2003; 
Henderson 2004a). Stucltes also find that the negative effects of such overconcentration are 
sipficant, l e a b g  to large losses in productivity and economic growth rates (Henderson, 
1999a; Henderson 2003). In light of these serious consequences, fmdmg effective policy 
instruments to reduce congestion has become a central question in the urban economics 
literature. Previous research suggest that investment in ITCI, that is intercity transportation 
and communications infrastructure, might be the solution to tlvs problem, as it makes 
locations with smaller populations more competitive (Wdhamson, 1965; Wheaton and 
Shishido 1981; Lee, 1997; Henderson, Kuncoro, Nasution, 1996; Henderson 1999a, Davis 
and Henderson 2003). However, in spite of such widely documented dispersion effect, as 
countries expand their interregonal transportation networks, concentration in urban areas 
continues to rise. The purpose of this paper is to explain the causes of such paradox, in 
order to provide further information on what policies are effective at reducing 
concentration. 
2. Literature Review 
Transportation and communications infrastructure networks induce changes in the 
population dstribution because they affect the ratio of economies and dseconomies of 
agglomeration, that is, the benefits and costs to economic agents, primarily firms, of locating 
in areas with large populations (Henderson, Kuncoro, Nasution, 1996; Henderson 1999a; 
Henderson, Lee & Lee 2001, Davis & Henderson, 2003). Specifically, ITCI reduce the 
benefits of concentration, whch originate in the savings of transportation and 
communication costs over space, and make spatial proximity advantageous. The literature on 
economies of agglomeration identifies four main advantages to economic agents of locating 
in populated areas. First, firms benefit from knowledge spdlovers, such as shared 
information regardmg production techniques, suppliers, customers, market condtions etc. 
(Marshall, 1890, Jacobs 1969). Second, both firms and workers benefit from low 
transportation costs; producers minimize transportation costs of goods by having a large 
population nearby and workers minimize commuting costs by living in the same city where 
fums are located. In turn, the hgher dversity of industries and specialized employees in 
populated areas produces a thud benefit, whch is that labor markets hnction better (Helsley 
& Strange 1990; I h g m a n  1991). T h s  not only means that there is better matclung between 
fums and workers, but also that producers are more efficient by having access to the services 
they might need from firms in other industries, such as fmancial, advertising and legal 
services, suppliers etc. (Dixit & Stiglitz 1977; Rahman & Fujita 1990). 
In spite of these important benefits, economic activity does not converge to a single 
location. T h s  is because in addition to economies of agglomeration, there are at least three 
&saggregating forces or Qseconomies of agglomeration. First, as cities become larger, wages 
and especially rent become increasingly costly due to the scarcity of land and firmsy 
competition for workers (Henderson 1999a). Second, the h u t s  in technical slulls to manage 
megacities create congestion, resulting in severe problems of pollution and long commuting 
costs for workers (Wheaton & Shishdo, 1981; Henderson 1999a; Accetturo, 2008). 
Henderson (1999b) shows in a study of 100 cities of 15-20 Qfferent countries that if the 
population of urban areas increases from 25,000 to 2.5 d o n ,  the costs of rent and 
commuting increase by 115%. Finally, the high cost of living and lower quality of life offsets 
some of the benefits of hgher wages in cities, which reduces the firms' competitiveness in 
attracting the most qualified workers (Muth 1969; Fujita & Owaga 1982). 
The location decision of economic agents depends on whether a location's 
economies of agglomeration are greater or smaller tlian their diseconomies of agglomeration. 
In other words, when the benefits of a large population outweigh the costs, it is efficient for 
economic agents to concentrate in a populated area. Once the costs derived of a large size 
equal its benefits, no further concentration is efficient. What the urban economics literature 
finds, however, is that economic agents systematically locate in large cities well beyond the 
optimal level of concentration, a phenomenon known as "urban bias" (Ades & Glaeser, 
1995; Henderson 1999a, Henderson 2003). There are two primary causes of urban bias. 
First, whereas a reduction in transportation costs can be easily estimated, congestion and 
pollution are unpriced or underpriced negative externalities (Henderson, 2004). Such 
negative externalities increase with population; hence they are comparatively more 
underpriced in large cities than in small towns. Second, decision-makers are 
disproportionately located in large urban areas and have greater awareness of investment 
opportunities in those cities than in other locations (Henderson, 1998; Ades and Glaeser 
1995). In addition, they have an incentive to increase living standards in the cities where they 
live rather than other areas. As a result, resources tend to be excessively centralized in large 
cities. The consensus in the urban economics literature is that the losses in productivity 
derived from inefficiently large cities are substantial (Henderson 1999a; Henderson 2003). 
Henderson (1999a) found that such losses can reach up to 1.5 annual percentage points of 
economic growth, an effect sxndar in map tude  to having significantly deficient investments 
in human and physical capital (Henderson, 2004a). 
The urban economics literature finds that investment in transportation and 
telecommunication infrastructure is the key policy instrument to reduce excessive 
concentration, as ITCI reduces the benefits of agglomeration and makes hmterland locations 
more competitive. Indeed, when economic agents can transport goods and obtain 
information at low cost without the need of close spatial proximity, agglomeration is less 
beneficial; especially considering that there are also costs in concentration. Research in 
urban economics supports tlus theoretical prelction. There have been lfferent approaches 
to the study of transportation and communications infrastructure and urban concentration. 
Some have stuled ths  relationship more indnectly, by lookmg at the connection between 
economic development, measured in GDP per capita, and agglomeration (Wdhamson, 1965; 
Wheaton 81 Shishdo, 1981; Parr 1985; Hansen, 1990, El-Shakhs 1992). They find that at 
early stages of development countries can only invest in public infrastructure in a few large 
cities, and conserve on spendmg that would instead be allocated to connect cities or create 
new cities. However, at later stages of development, countries can invest in transportation 
and communications infrastructure, whch allows small and medium-sized cities to become 
more competitive. T h s  process drives decentralization. 
Other studies look at the relationshp between transportation and communications 
infrastructure and urban concentration more directly. Henderson, Icuncoro, Nasution (1996) 
studied the effect of the development of major road networks from Jakarta to Bobatek, 
Bekasi and Tangerand (known together as Jabotabek) in Indonesia. The study found that, 
after the investment in the road network, Jakarta's share of employment in the 
manufacturing sector dropped drastically, from a 5'7'/0 in 1986 to 44% in 1991, and that 
employment moved to the cities that were connected to Jakarta through the road network. 
Sldarly, Henderson, Lee & Lee (2001) found that Korea's large investment in 
telecommunications since the late 1970s was followed by very rapid interregonal 
convergence in competitiveness, which generated decentralization from Seoul to other 
smaller cities. Finally, Henderson (1 99921) conducted a panel study from 1965 to 1995 for 
about 80 countries on the effect of transportation infrastructure on urban concentration. In 
line with previous studies, he found that increasing road and telephone h e  density networks 
has a significant effect in reducing concentration. Thus the conclusion from the all the 
research on h s  subject for the past four decades is clear: Investment in ITCI produces 
population dispersion. 
In spite of the diversity of approaches in this research, there is one more aspect that 
is common to all of these studies: they all use primacy, or the largest city's share of the urban 
population, as a measure of concentration. The reason for ths  common choice is that what 
has consequences for economic growth and quality of life is not urbanization per se, but the 
form that urbanization takes (Davis and Henderson, 2003; Henderson 2003). In other 
words, there is no evidence that concentration of the population in urban or rural areas 
affects economic growth rates, what affects growth rates is whether the population in cities 
is clustered in one or a few excessively concentrated urban areas as opposed to a system of 
medlum-sized efficient cities. Therefore, it makes sense to study problems of 
overconcentration by loolung at how policies affect the concentration of a large oversized 
city with respect to the rest. 
However, there are at least two reasons why only using primacy to study the effects 
of policies on concentration is sipficantly h t i n g .  First, many countries have multiple 
large centers where a significant part of the population is concentrated. Examples include 
Shanghai, Beijing, Wuhan and Hong Kong in Chma, San Francisco, Los Angeles and San 
Diego in California, Sydney and Melbourne in Australia, or Madrid, Barcelona and Valencia 
in Spain. As a result, restricting the study of excessive concentration to one city ignores the 
problems of overpopulation that other cities might have. Even if the population 
decentralizes from the largest city, if the recipients of such reduced populations are other 
oversized cities, productivity losses wdl persist. The second reason why using primacy is 
considerably lrrmting is that transportation and communications infrastructure do not 
connect all locations equally (Wdhamson, 1965, Wheaton & Shshdo, 1981; IGugman, 1996, 
Henderson 2004a; Henderson 2004b). Indeed, the hgh  costs involved in large infrastructure 
projects means that such projects wdl be more profitable to connect large cities, where there 
are greater economies of scale. If these investments reduce the cost of access to other 
markets, locauons where there are a greater proportion of such investments should become 
relatively more competitive than locations where there are a smaller proportion of those 
investments. As a result, the dispersion effect of ITCI should happen amongst connected 
locations, and there should be a concentration effect from the unconnected locations into 
the connected ones. 
Since primacy only considers the ratio of the population in the largest city with 
respect to other populated and connected areas, using k s  measure should only show the 
dispersion effect of transportation infrastructure. In order to make the concentration effect 
of transportation infrastructure visible, a variable that separates between a set of better and 
worse connected locations is needed. Hence, in ths  study I will compare the effect of 
transportation infrastructure on both primacy and urbanization, as urban areas are 
comparatively better connected than rural areas (Wdhamson, 1965, Wheaton & Shishido, 
1981; IGugrnan, 1996, Henderson 2004a; Henderson 2004b). If there were just a dispersion 
effect, increases in investments in transportation and communica~ons infrastructure should 
reduce both primacy and urbanization, as they are both measures of concentration. 
However, I hypothesize that interregional transportation infrastructure wdl reduce primacy 
and at the same time increase urbanization. In other words, we should see a dispersion effect 
from the largest city to other connected locations and a concentration effect from less well 
connected rural locations into better-connected urban ones. The rationale for using the 
urbanization variable is thus not to study changes in urbanizationper .re, but to examine 
whether transportation infrastructure produces concentration in larger cities that that have 
greater economies of scale. The existence of such economic force would have implications 
that are duectly relevant to the form that urbanization takes, that is, whether the population 
in cities is hghly concentrated in a few areas or more evenly spread over various medium- 
sized centers. 
2. Theory 
2.1. Main Assumptions 
In this section, I create a model for understandmg the economic forces behmd 
population Istribution, based on the fmdmgs of previous literature and the new insights this 
paper brings. I begin from the assumption that the concentration of natural resources and 
quality of living conItions are unequally lstributed in space, whch causes some areas to 
attract a greater amount of economic activity and population than others in the first place. 
The second main assumption is that Ifferent types of economic activity are dependant on 
location to lfferent degrees. For example, activities such as agriculture or mining can only 
take place in certain locations, whereas manufacturing and services are usually much less 
constrained by proximity to a parucular set of resources or geographc conltions. The thrrd 
assumption I make is that when location is a choice, economic agents, f m s  and workers, 
seek to establish themselves in areas where they can maximize profit or income, respectively. 
A key way in whch location can be a factor for profit-maximization is by minimizing 
transportation and communication costs. For example, lower transportation costs allows 
firms to deliver their products or services to customers faster and at a lower transaction cost. 
Adltionally, workers can have a greater lsposable income by spendmg less time and money 
on commuting costs. Finally, lower communication costs allows firms to exchange ideas and 
obtain more efficient production techniques more easily, whlch increases the margnal 
productivity of labor. 
2.2. Economies and Diseconomies of Ac~lomeration & Optimal Population 
The economics geography literature states that due to these important benefits 
derived from low transportation and communication costs, spatial proximity is desirable. 
This implies that location-independent economic activity is more efficient in more populated 
locations, as economic agents we able to interact with one another without having to incur 
in high intercity transportation costs. These benefits derived from city size, or economies of 
agglomeration, increase exponentially, since when an economic agent locates in a given area, 
it lowers transportation and communication costs to all other economic agents in that 
location. Because of that, the benefits of city size are self-reinforcing; that is, when an 
economic agent move into a particular location the incentive for others to move as well 
increases. However, just as increases in city size generates benefits it also creates costs or 
diseconomies of agglomeration. T h s  is because as a city grows in population, it also tends to 
grow in size, thus increasing the intra-city transportation costs. In addtion, more firms 
compete for workers and the same scarce land, whch increases rental prices. As with 
economies of agglomeration, the costs associated to city size also increase exponentially, 
because whenever an economic agent locates in a given area, it also raises commuting, rental 
and labor costs for everyone else. 
It is important to stress the dfference in exponential growth pattern between the 
economies and Qseconomies of agglomeration. Accordmg to the economics geography 
literature, the exponential growth in economies of agglomeration is initially much greater 
than the exponential growth in Qseconomies of agglomeration (Henderson, 1999a; 
Henderson 2003). As a result, up to a certain point, there is an increasing dvergence 
between the slopes of the economies and diseconomies of agglomeration curves, and 
concentration is increasingly more efficient. However, once a p e n  location has become 
very large, the costs of agglomeration increase much faster than the benefits, and the slopes 
of economies and Qseconomies of agglomeration are increasingly convergent. The equations 
for economies and Qseconomies of agglomeration for a given city A can thus be expressed 
as: 
where mA and DAA are economies and Qseconomies of agglomeration for city A ,  
respectively, and NA represents the population of city A. The term 6 on the equation for 
economies of agglomeration is a value between 0 and 1 that inQcates the extent to which 
the economic activity in a gven location A is location independent, with 0 being completely 
location dependent and thus having no economies of agglomeration, and 1 being fully 
location independent, and thus having large economies of agglomeration'. The other terms 
in the equation capture the relationshp of initial dvergence and later convergence of the 
economies and Qseconomies of agglomeration curves. First, in order for the slope of EAA 
to initially exceed the slope of DA, we assume that a > p. In order for DA, to exceed the 
slope of EA, at some point we assume that the exponents on the population term NA areQ 
= I, whereas P > I. In adQtion, in order to insure that the slope of DA, surpasses the slope 
of E f l ,  only at hgh  values of NA, we assume that (a - p) > > -a. In other words, the 
Qfference in the bases of the equations exceed the dfference in the exponents on the 
population term NA. I show these relationshps in the following set of graphs: 
1 
Broadly, the literature on this subject assumes that economies of agglomeration primady exist for 
manufacturing and services, and to a much lesser extent for agriculture, which is much a more 
location dependent type of economic activity (Henderson 1998; Henderson 2003; Davis & 
Henderson, 2003). 
Figure 1: Economies and Diseconomies of Agglomeration 
& O~timal  Population 
As the graph shows, the economies and diseconomies of agglomeration curves are initially 
increasingly divergmg and at some point become increasingly convergent. The graphs also 
show that the optimaIpopdation for a city occurs at the point where the m a r p a l  economies 
of agglomeration MEAA equal the m a r p a l  diseconomies of agglomeration MDAA, that is 
when the marginal net economies of agglomeration M N E f l ,  equal zero such that: 
MEA, = a N "  log(a)S 
MDA, = pNf  1 0 g ( p ) ~ ~ ~ - '  
MNEA, = MEA, - MDA, 
MNEA, = aNA log(a)b  - pN1 l o g ( p ) q ~ ; - '  (6) 
max(H) -+ MEA, = MDA, (7) 
max(II) -+ MNEA, = 0 (9) 
rnax(II) + MNEA, = orN* l o g ( a ) b  - pNH I O ~ ( / ? ) ~ N ; - '  = 0 (10) 
However, the relevant question in urban economics is not optimal population but 
optimal concentration. Indeed, even if a city stdl has marginal economies of agglomeration that 
exceed its margnal dseconomies of agglomeration, economic activity will be more efficient 
if it is located in an area with an even greater dfference between its marginal economies and 
Qseconomies of agglomeration. Slrmlarly, even if a city's marginal dseconomies of 
agglomeration exceed its margmal economies in a series of cities, productivity loses d be 
minimized if economic activity is located in that city in whlch marginal costs of 
agglomeration surpass the marginal benefits by the smallest dfference. Hence, the optimal 
concentration of a city A depends on its relative marginal economies and Qseconomies of 
agglomeration MEA, ,  and MDAA,. For simplifying purposes, let us consider a counuy 
which population is composed of only two cities, city A and city B. The optimal 
concentration of city A is thus gven by: 
max(II) -. MEA, - MDA, = MEA, - MDA, (1  1 )  
max(II) -. aNA log(a)d ,  - pN1 log(p)qNAq-l = aNs log(a)d ,  - pNi 1 o g ( / 3 ) q ~ ~ - '  (12) 
MNEA, = MEA, - MDA, ( 1  3) 
MNEA, = (MEA, - MDA, ) - (MEA, - MDA, ) ( 1  4) 
MNEA, = (a N A  log(a)6, - pNI I o ~ ( ~ ) ~ N : - ' )  - (a N" log(a)6, - pN1 I O ~ ( / ~ ) ~ N ~ - ~ )  (15) 
max(II) -, MNEA,, = 0 (16) 
2.3. The Problem of Excessive Concentration 
If we assume that the economic activity of city A is more independent of location 
than the economic activity of city B, such that 6, > G, then city A should reach a htgher 
population than city B, such that N, > N, unul the point at which the relative net marginal 
economies of agglomeration M N U , ,  equals zero. Indeed, if governments and economic 
agents correctly estimated economies and dseconomies of agglomeration, all locations 
would always have efficient sizes. However, econometric studes show that there is a 
systematic trend for economic agents to underestimate dseconomies of agglomeration, 
which leads to a systematic overpopulation of the largest cities (Ades & Glaeser, 1995; 
Henderson 1999a: Henderson 2003). There are two main reasons for the systematic 
underestimation of dseconomies of agglomeration. 
First, congestion and pollution are negative externalities that are unpriced or 
underserpriced and that are much higher in more populated areas, hence they are 
comparatively much more underpriced in large cities (Henderson, 2004a). Second, decision- 
makers tend to be dsprop~rtionatel~ ocated in the larger locations and they are better 
informed of opportunities for investments in such locations than in other areas (Ades & 
Glaeser, 1995; Henderson 1999a: Henderson 2003). Addtionally, they have an incentive to 
increase living standards where they live, so that they can drcectly benefit from these 
investments (Henderson 2004a). The combinatton of underpricing of negative externalities, 
information and incentive structure asymmetries induces decision-makers to have a 
preference for locating their private or public economic activity in the larger cities in which 
they live in. Hence, there is a discrepancy betweenperceived dlseconornies of agglomerationZ 
and real lseconomies of agglomeration, such that: 
Perceived DA, < DAA 
Since lseconomies of agglomeration are much greater in very populated areas than 
in less populated areas, there is a bias towards excessive population concentration in large 
urban areas, whch prevents cities from achieving efficient sizes. In the following set of 
graphs we can observe the previously lscussed determination of optimal city size as well as 
the problem of overconcentration. 
Fi~ure 2: The Problem of Excessive Concentration 
2 Perceived diseconomies of agglomeration is simply one way to model the different forces that lead 
to excessive concentration, not a literal description of the problem. In reality, there are other factors 
that also lead to overconcentration, such as the coordination failure problem, that is, workers and 
firms are too small to start new cities, and so they all cluster in existing locations. 
2.4. Spatial Deoendencv: The Imoact of ITCI 
Since there is a systematic trend towards excessive population concentration in large 
cities, which causes large productivity losses (Henderson 1999; Henderson, 2003), fmQng 
effective policies to reduce this problem has become a central question in the economics 
geography literature. The consensus in the urban economics literature is that the key policy 
instrument to reduce the problem of excessive concentration is intercity transportation and 
communications infrastructure. However, in order to understand why that is the case, first it 
is important to explain how ITCI can affect the concentration of cities. 
In order to make the model I have been developing more realistic, it is very 
important to incorporate the concept of ~patial dependmy. Spatial dependency is the idea that 
any given location's absolute economies of agglomeration is also dependant on its position 
with respect to all other locations. Hence, for example, if a small city is close to a very 
populated area, its economies of agglomeration are sull very hgh, as economic agents have 
very low intercity transportation costs to an area where there is hgh  density. Sirmlarly, even 
if a particular city has a large population, if it is very far away from a group of other large 
cities that are closer to each other, its economies of agglomeration may not be as hgh as that 
of those other cities. Hence, we can redefine economies of agglomeration for a given city A 
as the sum of its population N, and the population of other locations nT,, N,, N,], N, etc. 
divided by the intercity transportation ITC costs to each of those locations. However, as I 
mentioned earlier, for simplifying purposes, I consider a country composed of only two 
cities A and B. Hence, a city A economies of agglomeration is gven by: 
S d a r l y ,  the economies of agglomeration for city B is given by: 
It is important to note that, for obvious reasons, the intercity transportation costs between 
cities A and B are equal regardless of the direction, such that ITCAB= ITCBA. The intercity 
transportation costs between two cities A and B increase as a function of &stance dAB, and 
decrease with intercity transportation and communications infrastructure ITCIA,, such that: 
d AB ITC, = - 
ITCIA, 
Since ITCI can only reduce the intercity transportation costs generated by distance in the 
f ~ s t  place, the value of dAB for two locations wdl always be greater than their corresponhg 
ITCI,,, hence ITC,, wdl always be greater than one. Mathematically: 
d, > ITCI, 
ITC, > 1 (22) 
Since the effect of increasing ITCI is to reduce the intercity transportation costs ITC, ITCI 
also increases indtrectly the economies of agglomeration of the connected locations, because 
economic agents in both cities now have lower intercity transportation costs to each other 
markets. In fact, as the ITC become closer and closer to one due to increasing ITCI, each of 
the cities economies of agglomeration grows as though the population in the other location 
was part of the city's own population. Because of that, reducing intercity transportation costs 
through ITCI has a s d a r  effect as bringmg the cities closer into space. 
One more aspect that is worth mentioning is that I assume that there is no spatial 
dependency for &seconomies of agglomeration. This is a fairly realistic assumption, as for a 
given city, increases in population in other cities or towns should not increase its congestion 
or rental costs of that city, except when the two cities are very close or right next to each 
other. That is perhaps the key advantage of linkmg cities through ITCI, that, unhke 
population growth in cities, it increases the economies of agglomeration without increasing 
the Qseconomies of agglomeration. 
2.5. Asymmetric Returns of ITCI: The Dispersion Effect 
Numerous econometric stuQes find evidence for what I call in &IS paper the dipersion 
effect, that is, the transfer of economic activity and population that occurs when a large city is 
connected through ITCI with a smaller city (Wdhamson, 1965; Wheaton & Shishdo, 1981; 
Henderson 1999a; Henderson, 2003). The reason is conceptually straightforward: connecting 
two cities through transportation and communication channels makes a smaller connected 
city B more competitive, as economic agents in that location have more equal access to the 
greater market of the larger city A. In other words, although the absolute economies of 
agglomeration of cities increase, the relative economies of agglomeration of the larger 
city A falls, because a reduction in intercity transportation costs between the two cities 
benefits the smaller city B to a greater extent than it benefits city A. This makes sense: a 
reduction in transportation cost to a larger market is more beneficial than an equivalent 
reduction in transportation costs to a smaller market. As a result, for two cities of dfferent 
sizes, an equal reduction in transportation costs between them produces asymmetric returns. 
Using the model I proposed, the relationship is mathematically unambiguous: 
The effect of a better transportation or communications infrastructure between two 
locations is to decrease intercity transportation costs by the same amount, such that: 
f ITCI, -+ J ITC,, 
f FcIBA + l ITC, (24) 
AITC, = AITC, (25) 
However, a reduction in intercity transportation costs to a larger city increases economies of 
agglomeration by more than an equivalent reduction in intercity transportation costs to a 
smaller city. As before, the economies of agglomeration of cities A and B are gven by: 
NQ ( N z + l \  
EA, =6,(a 
J. ITC, = J. ITC, + AEA, < AEA, (27) 
NEA, - NEA, < 0 + NEA, < 0 (28) 
As these mathematical relationshps show, h k m g  a large city A with a smaller city B makes 
the relative economies of agglomeration of city A fall, because the absolute economies of 
agglomeration of city B increase by more than the absolute economies of agglomeration of 
city A. The result of thls is that the relative economies of agglomeration and its perceived 
&seconomies of agglomeration cross at a lower point, thus leading to a more efficient level 
of concentration and reducing productivity loses. T h ~ s  phenomenon can be observed in the 
following graph, in whlch we move from a point b of large productivity loses to a point c, at 
which productivity loses are substantially reduced. 
Figure 3: The Dis~ersion Effect of ITCI 
2.6. The Concentration Effect of ITCI 
In addtion to a dspersion effect, I hypothesize that intercity transportation and 
communication infrastructure also produces a concentration effect. It is important to clarify 
that h s  effect does not refer to the gain in population by a smaller connected city B from 
the larger city A it is connected to. That is simply the kspersion effect considered from the 
perspective of location B. I refer to such phenomenon as the dispersion effect regardless of 
whether it is considered from the perspective of location A or B because both cases describe 
the same event of a transfer in population from a more populated location to a smaller one. 
The dspersion effect thus only involves redstribution of the population amongst 
locations connected by ITCI. Conversely, the concentration effect involves a net gain in 
population of connected locations relative to unconnected ones. T h s  effect, which previous 
research had not identified, occurs because economic agents in both A and B, by reducing 
their transportation costs to each other's markets, increase their relative economies of 
agglomeration with respect to other unconnected locations C. The main reason why some 
cities do not get connected or get worse connections through ITCI is economies of scale 
(Wdhamson, 1965; Wheaton & Shtshtdo, 1981; Krugman, 1996, Henderson, 2004a; 
Henderson2004b). The large costs involved in large infrastructure projects means that such 
investments become more profitable as the size of the connected locations increase. Thus, 
the comparatively greater connection and access to markets of locations A or B increase 
incentives for economic agents in C to locate in one of those larger locations. We can 
observe thls result mathematically: 
First, we assume that 6, > 6,  > 6 ,  so that N, >N, > N, 
For a location C, intercity transportation costs to A and B have not changed: Hence: 
ITCcA(t  + 1) = ITCcA(t  ) (29) 
rcCB(t+l)  = ITCCB(t)  (30) 
Hence, the absolute economies of agglomeration of city C have also not changed: 
E A , ( t + , )  = E A C ( t )  (31) 
However, as I explained earlier, the improvement of the connection between city A and city 
B through ITCI,, increased the absolute economies of agglomeration of both city A and B. 
As a result, both the relative economies of agglomeration of cities A and B increase relative 
to that of C.For cities A and C: 
S d a r l y ,  for cities B and C: 
4 ITC, -S AEABc > AEAcB 
Hence, in addtion to the lspersion effect, ITCI makes the locations it connects A and B 
relatively more competitive than the locations it does not connect. Ths,  in turn, produces 
population concentration from the unconnected locations C into the connected locations A 
and B. This can be observed in the following graph: 
Fimre 4: The Concentration Effect of ITCI 
As the graph shows, if we consider both the Qspersion and concentration effects, 
economies of agglomeration of location A shfts up somewhat and it intersects its perceived 
Qseconomies of agglomeration at a hgher point than estimated by just considering the 
Qspersion effect. As a result, when we consider the impact of both effects, the loss in 
concentration and congestion will be smaller than preQcted by only taking into account the 
decentralizing effects of ITCI. This is shown in the Qscrepancy between points d and c. Since 
for the largest city A, the Qspersion and concentration effects have opposite duections 
(unhke in the case of city B), whether the population in the largest city increases or decreases 
depends on the relative map tude  of the Qspersion DE and concentration effects CE. 
Thus, for city A: 
However, regardless of the relative maptudes of the Qspersion and concentration effects, it 
is certainly true that: 
DE+CE>DE (3 8) 
Hence, calculations that only consider the dspersion effect d overstate the reduction in 
congestion and increase in profits by the map tude  of the concentration effect. 
2.7. The Guiding Equation 
I construct my guidmg equation based on the theory about the determinants of 
concentration dscussed above. Such determinants are the Qstribution of natural resources, 
the percentage of the economy devoted to manufacturing and services, ITCI and resource 
centralization or urban bias. In addtion, since previous literature Qscusses that a certain 
level of income is required to invest in infrastructure in the first place, I also include GDP 
per capita in the equation. Thus the guiding equation is the following: 
PopulationConcentration = a + P,NR + P,Sector + P,TC + P,GDPpc + P,RC + & (39) 
where NR refers to natural resources, Sector stands for the manufacturing and services' share 
of GDP, TC refers to transportation and communica~on channels, GDPpc stands for 
income per capita and RC refers to resource centralization. The main variable of interest in 
h s  paper is transportation and communication channels TC, as this study's goal is to 
examine its effectiveness as a policy instrument for reducing concentration. Based on the 
theory hscussed above, I predict that the sign of the coefficient on ITCI wdl depend on the 
measure of concentration used. Specifically, when using primacy, the coefficient on 
transportation and communication channels should be negative, as there is a dispersion 
effect from larger locations to smaller connected locations. T h s  is also the result that studies 
using such measure of concentration find. However, if the measure of concentration is 
urbanization, the coefficient of transportation and communications channels should be 
positive, thus showing the concentration effect from less well connected areas to connected 
ones. 
With respect to the other independent variables, I expect a negative coefficient for 
the lstribution of natural resources when using primacy, as the concentration of economic 
activity in one location becomes less efficient as resources are spread. However, the expected 
sign of the coefficient for thts variable when using urbanization is ambiguous. Indeed, a 
moderate degree of resource decentralization allows for economic activity to be located in 
various efficient sized clusters, thus allowing for greater urbanization than if all resources 
were in one inefficiently large location. At the same time, when resources are widely 
hspersed, urbanization should declme. Economic activity in manufacturing and services is 
much more efficient in close spatial proximity, hence I expect a positive coefficient for 
urbanization. 
The effect of manufacturing and services on primacy will depend on the stage of 
urbanization. Based on Wdhamson (1965) hypothesis, at initial stages of the sectoral shft, 
when countries lack resources to invest in multiple urban locations, primacy should increase. 
However, at later stages of the sectoral shft, when countries can invest in multiple urban 
locations, the largest city's share of urban population should decline a greater proportion of 
the population moves to urban areas. T h s  hypothesis also assumes a strong association 
between sectoral specialization and income per capita, whch many stuQes find support for 
(Davis and Henderson, 2003). As a result, it is lrkely that these two variables may be 
cohear .  Finally, I hypothesize resource centralization or urban bias d increase both 
primacy and urbanization, as concentration of resources in large locations should make less 
populated areas relatively less competitive. 
4. Data & Summary Statistics 
In order to empirically test the concentration and hspersion effects, I created a panel 
dataset that includes 70 countxies and coverage for the period between 1960-2009 every 5 
years, using most of the same variables that Henderson (1999a) used for h s  research. As I 
mentioned earlier, the main Qfference is that I use two measures of population 
concentration, primacy and urbanization, as my dependent variables. Both variables are 
widely used in the urban economics literature but only primacy has been used for studylng 
the effect of policies on excessive concentration. The reason for such choice is that 
productivity losses are caused by whether particular locations have excessive concentration, 
as opposed to the degree of urbanized population (Henderson 1999a; Henderson, 2003; 
Henderson 2004b). The purpose of using the urbanization variable is thus only to test 
whether transportation infrastructure produces concentration from less populated areas into 
more populated ones. If interregional transportation infrastructure really has a drspersion 
effect, it should be present regardless of the measure of population concentration. T h s  
concentration effect is directly relevant to the form that urbanization takes, whch is the 
aspect that affects economic growth rates (Henderson 1999a; Henderson, 2003). I obtained 
the data for these variables from the World Development Inkcators. 
In order to measure ITCI, I obtained panel data for roads and railways (in krn) from 
World Development Indrcators and faed telephone h e s  (per 100 people) data from the 
International Telecommunications Union. The WDI road and railway data only covers the 
period from 1980 to 2010, but I was able to obtain adktional road data from 1963-1979 
from the International Road Federation. Both sources used the same defmition and 
measurement for roads, so I merged the data I had for both time periods to create a dataset 
with coverage from 1963-2010. Another transformation I k d  to the road and rdway data is 
to standardrze them to a common scale to control for country size, by drviding them by the 
land area of their respective countries, as Henderson (1999,2003) k d  in h s  study. I obtained 
such land area data from the CIA World Factbook. In order to account for natural types of 
transportation channels that have a s d a r  function as ITCI, I obtained data for waterways 
(in krn), also from the CIA World Factbook. As with roads and railways, I then transformed 
the data to waterways density by Qvidmg the variable by land area. I also use the land area 
data to measure the dstribution of natural resources, as prior research indicates that as land 
area increases natural resources become more scattered, thus promoting population 
Qspersion (Rappaport and Sacks, 2001). 
With respect to sectoral specialization, I obtained data for agriculture's percentage 
share of GDP from the World Development Indcators and then transformed th~s  data to 
the manufacturing and services' share of economic activity by subtracting the data to one 
hundred. The data I collected for real GDP per capita (in dollars) comes from the World 
Development Indcators as well, and I transformed the data to reflect income in thousands 
of dollars, whch is much more informative than individual dollars. In order to measure 
resource centralization or urban bias, I obtained data for the share of central government 
consumption and openness to trade from the Penn World Tables. The h k  between 
concentration and openness is not evident. The economic geography literature suggests that 
greater trade increases incentives for policymakers to pursue efficient allocation of resources, 
as there is a threat that international producers might move to other countries (Henderson, 
2004a). Addtionally, I constructed a dummy variable for whether the largest city is the 
capital, by comparing data for countries largest cities and countries capitals from Nation 
Master. 
Prior to computing the summary statistics for these variables, I used several methods 
to clean the data, such as removing any former countries (e.g. Czechoslovaha, East 
Germany etc.), regons or areas that are not countries (e.g. high income countries, European 
Union, Atlantic Ocean etc.) as well as countries that had data with impossible ratios, such as 
having more than 100°/o of urbanization, primacy, central government share of consumption, 
manufacturing and services share of GDP, or fmed telephone lmes per 100 people. In total, 
there were 175 geographc areas that fulfilled one of these criteria and were removed from 
the dataset. Before these changes were made, the variables that used ratios had lstributions 
that were hghly skewed to the right. After the data was cleaned, all the ratio variables had 
very symmetrical normal dstributions. Excludmg geographc areas also had the effect of 
reducing the size of the dataset and hence the number of observations. However, I was able 
to gain many observations by giving uniform labels to countries that had been named 
dfferently by dfferent data sources. In total, there were about 50 countries that had been 
given dfferent names by the lfferent data sources, and some cases countries had numerous 
lfferent names, as in the case of South Korea. 
In computing the descriptive statistics, I disaggregated the data into time and cross- 
country variation, in order to show how much of the panel variation occurs in each of those 
two dunensions. Table 1 includes the total variation of the data, and Tables 2 and 3 show the 
cross-country and time variation of the data, respectively. All three tables are in arithmetic 
scale, as they are much more informative in such format than in logarithmic scale. 
Nonetheless, I included a table with values in logarithmic scale, in order to be able to 
compare values with prevlous studies. I contrasted the values in logs I obtained with that of 
Henderson (1999a) study, and overall the variables have very slmdar means and standard 
deviations, in spite of the fact that the study covers a greater time period (1960-2010, as 
opposed to 1960-1995). The dummy variable for whether the largest city is the capital was 
not included in any of the summary statistics tables, and the country invariant variables such 
as waterways and land area of countries were not included in the time-series table. The most 
s t r h g  aspect common to all tables using the arithmetic scale is the enormous dfference in 
unit scale across variables, for example rail density ranges between 0 and 0.12, whereas land 
area ranges between 2 and 27400000. When the data is transformed to logs these dfferences 
in scale are largely reduced, however, there are stdl important dfferences in range of 
variation amongst the independent variables. For example, the standard deviation of land 
area is 3.02 percentage points, more than twelve times than that of manufacturing and 
services share of GDP, wlvch is only 0.22 percentage points. By comparing the values in 
tables 2 and 3 we can also observe that the variation in the data IS much greater across 
countries than across time, which is consistent with the lack of large dfferences between the 
descriptive statistics in h s  study and Henderson's (1999a). 
Nevertheless, time variation has the advantage that it provides information about 
how all independent variables affect the evolution of the concentration measures. I show the 
change over time in population concentration, measured in primacy and urbanization, in 
Figure 5. The comparison of the urbanization and primacy trends reveals a s t r h g  fact: 
although the average largest city's share of urban population has been consistently deching, 
the share of the population concentration in urban areas has been consistently rising. 
Moreover, the increase in the concentration in urban areas has a substantially steeper slope 
than the decrease in concentration in the largest city. In fact, the figure shows that the 
average level of urbanization across countries crosses the 50°/o benchmark around the early 
1990s. It is important to dstinguish h s  measure from world urbanization, whch considers 
the percentage of the total world's population living in urban areas. Accordmg to the United 
Nations (2007) world urbanization surpassed the 50% benchmark in 2006, about 15 years 
later than the urbanization cross-country average. This discrepancy suggests that less 
populated countries are more urbanized, as their impact is small on total world urbanization 
and large on the cross-country average, whch gves equal weight to small and large 
countries. 
Figures 6 and 7 show the relationshp between road density and primacy and 
urbanization, respectively. The variables are shown in logarithmic scale, as the range of 
variation in road density is so narrow that plotting the variable in arithmetic scale would 
crowd together the data. As the graphs show, the strength of these correlations is modest in 
both cases, -0.12 in the case of road density and primacy and 0.36 in the case of road density 
and urbanization. However, the most remarkable aspect is that the correlations of the 
concentration measures and road density have opposite signs. T h s  discrepancy is shown 
more clearly in Figure 8. These correlations are consistent with the theoretical prediction that 
ITCI produces population hspersion amongst connected locations and population 
concentration from the unconnected areas into the connected ateas. However, since the 
figure only shows a correlation, it is possible that these hffering trends are explained by the 
influence of other factors. I explore h s  question in the following section. 
5. Analysis 
5.1. Estimation Issues & Estimation Equation 
In order to be consistent with previous literature, I use road density as my measure 
of intercity transportation infrastructure. However, there is an endogeneity problem in using 
such variable, as roads are highly concentrated in urban areas. In other words, roads are both 
a type of inter and intra city transportation infrastructure. Since urban growth and intra-city 
transportation infrastructure are positively correlated, the causality relationshp between 
urban concentration and transportation infrastructure occurs in both hections. Henderson 
(1999a) acknowledges this problem and deals with it by includmg urbanization as an 
independent variable in the primacy regression, as an instrumental variable for intracity road 
investments. However, such technique does not seem ideal. The best way to deal with thts 
problem would be to have variables that disaggregated data for inter and intra city public 
capital. Since no such data is available, railway density seems to be a good option to measure 
ITCI, since radways are primarily used for intercity transportation purposes, whereas roads 
are largely used for both inter and intra city functions. I wdl explore thls possibhty in a 
robustness check. 
I computed the pairwise correlations amongst the independent variables to test for 
multicollinearity. I report these values on Table 5. There is very hgh cohearity between all 
the public capital variables, especially between road and railway density, which is over 30.  
This suggests that countries make investments in different types of public capital 
simultaneously. As a result, any of these variables may be used to measure public capital, and 
when used they should be regressed separately, not together. Income per capita and the 
GDP share of manufacturing and services have a very hgh  positive correlation of 0.77. This 
is to be expected, as it is widely documented in the economic development literature that 
production in manufacturing and services activities is far greater than that of agricultural 
activities. GDP per capita also has a high level of cohearity with all the public capital 
variables, especially fured telephone h e s ,  whch is almost 0.90. As a result of this high 
colhearity with both the public capital variables and sectoral specialization in manufacturing 
and services, I decided to drop the variable from the regression. Specialization in 
manufacturing and services has a very strong theoretical justification as a determinant of 
economies of agglomeration; hence I had to maintain that variable in the regression. The 
theoretical justification for income per capita is, however, primarily h t e d  to the effect of 
growth in investments in public capital, whch I include in the regression. There are no 
strong theoretical reasons to believe that growth in other ktnds of economic activity (e.g. the 
human genome project) have sipficant effects on urban concentration. 
I tested for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation using the Wooldridge and Wald 
tests, respectively, and in both cases I obtained significant results. Both of these results are 
not surprising. Significant heteroskedasticity may have been produced by the inclusion of 
numerous countries with very different sizes, as shown in the large standard deviations of 
land area and urban population. Variations in small countries should be much greater than 
variations in large countries, as any small change in a given variable is relatively much greater 
in a small country than in a large country. Serial correlation may be due to the fact that I 
lagged all the policy variables (road density, central government consumption and openness), 
by one period, that is five years. This is also the approach used in Henderson's (1999a, 2003) 
research, and the theoretical justification for such choice is that the effect of policy decisions 
is not immediate. Since no further research has been conducted on the exact lag of these 
effects, a one period lag (5 years) is used as a default. I corrected these estimation problems 
of significant heteroskedasticity and serial correlation by using robust standard errors in my 
regressions. Besides these issues, I checked for unit roots by using the Fisher test, but found 
no significant evidence for non-stationary. Finally, I decided to use a double-log form for my 
estimation equations, both for consistency with previous literature and because it spreads the 
data of variables that have a narrow range of variation, such as the public capital variables. 
Therefore, I express my estimation equations for primacy and urbanization as follows: 
Log PRIMACY), = a+PlLog(RD)(, ,)I + P,Log(SECTOR), + P,Log(GOV)(t-l)l + P,Log(OP)(t- 
I ) +  P , L o g W ) ,  + P,Log(LA), + P, (CAPITAL), + B,Log(URB), + e, (40) 
Log (URBANIZATION), = a+p,Log(RD)(,,), + B,Log(SECTOR), + p,Log(GOV)(,.,,, + 
P,Log(OP)')(, I , + P,LogOXrD), + P,Log(LA), + B, (CAPITAL), + el (41) 
where RD is road density, SECTOR is the percentage of GDP that is devoted to 
manufacturing and services, GOV is central government consumption, OP is openness to 
trade, WD is waterway density, LA is stand for land area3, and CAPITAL is the dummy 
variable for whether the country's largest city is the capital. 
5.2. Main Results 
I specified the country invariants waterway density and land area, as opposed to running the 
regression with fixed effects. This is because there are many country invariants, whlch do not explain 
urban concentration, hence running the regression with fixed effects drops the adjusted R-squares. 
I present my results in terms of the percentage change of one standard deviation of 
the dependent variable per one standard deviation increase in each independent variable in 
Table 64. This is the technique that Henderson (1999a) uses to interpret results, which is an 
essential element to control for Qfferent ranges of variation of the variables. For example, a 
one percent increase in a variable such as GDP share of manufacturing and services is 
equivalent to increasing it by more than four standard deviations. However, a one percent 
increase in land area would be an increase of less than a thud of its standard deviation. 
Hence, the raw coefficients overstate the impact of variables with low standard deviations 
and understate the effect of factors with large ones. Nevertheless, I included the raw 
coefficients in Table 10 in the appendm section. 
The effect of road density on primacy is in h e  with the theoretical preQction and 
consistent with previous literature. Increasing road density by one standard deviation reduces 
primacy by almost 13%, very slrmlar to what Henderson (1999a) found5 . The p-value is 
0.059, thus thls result is statistically sipficant at the 10% level. However, an even more 
significant result is the effect of road density on urbanization, which is positive and 
statistically sipficant at the 1% level. Increasing road density by one standard deviation 
increases population in urban areas by 15% of a standard deviation in urbanization6. Ths 
result is not only consistent with the theoretical prediction of a concentration effect, but in 
4 The adjusted coefficients were obtained with the formula % A a y  = pxk / [(I / aXk ) * 1001 1 0, , 
where a refers to the standard deviation, xk to a given independent variable k, y to the dependent 
variable and pXK is the raw coefficient of variable xk. 
5 Henderson (1999a) found that a one standard deviation increase in road density reduces primacy by 
10% of its standard deviation. 
6 The samples in the urbanization and primacy regressions are not exactly equal, since ths  type of 
macro level data tends to be very unbalanced. As happens with previous panel data studies 
(Henderson, 1999), this leads us to be cautious in comparing coefficients across regressions. 
However, this seems to be a better option than making all samples exactly equal, as that would result 
in the loss of a substantial amount of observations. 
fact suggests that such concentration effect in cities is stronger than the hspersion effect 
from the primate city to other urban areas. If investments in ITCI only had the effect of 
maktng hmterland locations more competitive, as the urban economics literature suggests, 
the effect of roads should be to reduce urbanization. The results provided here suggest 
otherwise and are consistent with the idea that ITCI has the effect of inducing population 
concentration into the locations it connects from the locations it does not connect. Small 
locations, such as rural areas, often lack economies of scale to make investments in public 
capital cost-effective and are thus often not connected or connected by less expensive types 
of infrastructure. Hence, when better public capital is located elsewhere, the incentive for 
economic agents to move to that area increases. 
The coefficients of other variables are generally in h e  with theoretical prehctions. 
Waterway density, as road density, strongly reduces primacy, about 26% of its standard 
deviation, and the effect is significant at the 5% level. This makes sense: theoretically, 
waterways should have a s d a r  effect to that of ITCI of fachtating transportation and 
communication, thus promoting population hspersion. However, it is noteworthy that 
waterways, unlike public capital, do not seem to promote significant concentration in urban 
areas. Why? A possible explanation is that waterways, unlike public capital, is not 
systematically planned to connect locations of a certain size. Both small towns and large 
cities can benefit from waterway connections. Thus, there is no reason why denser networks 
of rivers, lakes and seas should sipficantly increase urbanization. Land area, another 
geography variable, also strongly reduces primacy, as expected. When resources are more 
scattered, it becomes more costly to concentrate in a single location. By the same token, 
when a country's territory is not very large, and all the resources and land are concentrated in 
a small area, the population tends to cluster. As an extreme example to illustrate this point, 
in Singapore there is virtually no room for the population to spread outside of the city, hence 
the whole population is clustered in the same area. The significantly positive effect of land 
area on urbanization is less clear. It is possible that having a very large land area requires 
having multiple large cities as centers of hfferent regons, thus reducing primacy and 
increasing urbanization. Some examples that would fit ths  explanation are Canada, China 
and Australia. 
Also in line with expectations, sectoral specialization in manufacturing and services 
has a very large positive effect in increasing urbanization, about a 41 % increase of its 
standard deviation, statistically sigmficant at the 1% level. T h s  result is consistent with the 
idea that industrial and service activities are much more efficient in high density, where there 
are knowledge spdlovers and a large demand nearby. The effect of specialization in 
manufacturing and services has a positive but insipficant effect on primacy. As hscussed in 
the theory section, the relationshp between sectoral specialrzation and primacy is 
ambiguous. It is possible that at initial stages of industriahation, most of the population 
clusters in the primate city. However, as the city reaches its peak population and other urban 
clusters develop, further industrialization and movement to urban areas reduces the largest 
city's share of urban population. In other words, since primacy is a ratio that has the total 
urban population as the denominator, if urban population increases in areas other than the 
largest city, primacy wdl decrease, even if the population in the largest city does not fall or 
grows by a smaller magmtude. For thls reason, the coefficient on urban population is 
negative and economically and statistically sigmficant in the primacy regression. 
With respect to the variables that measure resource centralization, the effects of 
increasing openness to trade is negative for primacy and positive for urbanization, as 
expected. However, these coefficients are not statistically or economically sigmficant, as 
Henderson (1999a) found. The coefficients for central government consumption have 
coefficients with signs contrary to expectations, however, the effects also insipficant. It is 
possible that the effect of government centralism is primarily captured by the dummy 
variable for whether the primate city is the capital. The effect of being the capital increases 
primacy by over 36% of its standard deviation, very s d a r  to what Henderson (1999a) 
found, however ths  result is not statistically sipficant. T h s  effect is, however, economically 
and statistically sipficant for urbanization. If the largest city is the capital, urbanization 
increases by over 27% of its standard deviation, and the effect is sigmficant at the 5% level. 
Indeed, since urbanization includes the population of the largest city, if the population in the 
largest city increases the urban population will also increase is part of that growth is driven 
from migrants from rural areas. 
5.3. Robustness 
For the first robustness check, I transformed the population concentration measures 
into two new variables, the share of the total population in urban areas other than the 
primate city and the largest city's share of the total population7. I then performed regressions 
using the same independent variables against these two new measures, which I present in 
Table 7 .  I begin by Qscussing the regression on secondary urban areas. If the dynamics of 
the dispersion and concentration effect really work as theoretically preQcted, the increase in 
secondary urban areas should exceed the increase in urbanization. Tlus is because in addition 
To obtain these measures, I simply multiplied primacy by urbanization to obtain the population 
share of the largest. I then subtracted that number to urbanization to obtain the share of the 
population in secondary urban areas, that is, the urbanized share of the population excluding the 
primary city. 
to the concentration effect from the unconnected rural areas into the connected network of 
urban areas, secondary urban areas should also absorb the reduction in the population of the 
primate city produced by the Qspersion effect. The results from the robustness check show 
exactly that. A one standard deviation increase in road density increases the population share 
in secondary urban areas by over 25.62% of its standard deviation, compared to the 15.33% 
increase in population share in urban areas, and the effect is sipficant at the 1% level. 
Hence, ths  is consistent with the idea that the Qspersion and concentration effects have the 
same lrection for connected secondary urban areas. 
However, this paper's theory section also predcts that the dispersion and 
concentration effects have opposite duections for the largest city. In other words, 
theoretically, the largest city loses population with respect to other connected cities and gains 
population from unconnected towns or cities. Hence, its reduction of the population should 
be smaller with respect to the total population, whlch considers both connected and 
unconnected areas than with respect to urban areas, whch only considers connected 
locations. The results support this conclusion. A one standard deviation increase in road 
density reduces the largest city's share of the total population by 9.59% of its standard 
deviation, compared to a 12.73% reduction in a standard deviation of primacy, an the effect 
is sipficant at the 10% level. As predicted, the loss in population in the primate city 
produced by the kspersion effect is somewhat offset by the increase in population of the 
concentration effect. Thus, although the Qspersion effect is dominant, the reduction in 
population in the primate city is substantially smaller when both effects are considered. By 
ths  measure, only considering the Qspersion effect overstates the reduction in population of 
the largest city by about 25%, a substantial Qscrepancy. 
For my second robustness check, I used rail density to measure public capital, and 
regressed it against all four measures of concentration, I show the results of these regressions 
on Table 8. Rad density has the advantage that, unlike roads, it has a primarily intercity 
transportation function, and thus reduces the endogeneity associated with including intracity 
transportation infrastructure. However, rail density also has the &sadvantage of comprising a 
relatively small portion of transportation infrastructure investments compared to roads, and 
thus it does not fully capture the variation in ITCI. Because each measure of public capital 
has different pros and cons, a comparison of their effects can be very informative. Overall, 
the effects of rail density are very consistent with those of road density. As with roads, 
railway density reduces primacy and the largest city's population share, and at the same time 
increases urbanization and the share of the population of secondary urban areas. However, 
there are also some important hfferences. First, rail density shows a much stronger 
dspersion effect than roads. Increasing rail density by one standard deviation reduces 
primacy by over 28% of a standard deviation of primacy, an effect more that is more than 
twice as strong as that observed with roads. The effect is significant at the 1% level. At the 
same time, rail density shows a weaker concentration effect, as it increases urbanization by 
about 9.27% of its standard deviation, compared to the 15.3356 observed with roads, and the 
effect is significant at the 10% level. 
However, the most surprising fact is that, contrary to expectations, the increase in 
population share produced by railway density is somewhat weaker for secondary urban areas 
than in all urban areas. A one standard deviation increase in rail density increases the share 
of secondary urban areas by 8.9% of its standard deviation, and the effect is statistically 
sipficant at the 10% level. A possible explanation for this result is that the concentration 
effect in the largest city is much stronger than that produced in secondary urban areas. This 
can occur when the primate city is well connected to other locations but those other 
locations are not well connected to each other. An example of such a possibhty is the 
Spanish High Speed Rail System, whch connects all the province capitals to Madrid, the 
capital city, but does not connect those other cities duectly to each other. For example, 
Madrid is connected duectly to both Barcelona and Valencia; the second and third largest 
cities of the country, but such cities are not duectly connected to each other (ADIF, 2010) , 
even though they are in closer spatial proximity (CIA World Factbook). If the largest city is 
at the center of the transportation infrastructure network, economic agents in that city have 
disproportionately better access to other markets, thus inducing a comparatively stronger 
concentration effect. The results for the largest city's share of the population support this 
proposition. Increasing rail density by one standard deviation reduces the share of the 
population of the largest city by 21.37%, about 7 percentage points less than the effect on 
primacy. The dfference in results between roads and railways suggests thus might be due to 
the dfferent structure of the transportation infrastructure networks. Railways might be 
planned as a network with a clearer center, whereas road networks may be more 
comprehensive and have a less defined principal dstributor. Thus, different types of ITCI 
may favor cities of different sizes to dfferent degrees. 
As a final robustness check, I regressed fured telephone h e s ,  another type of ITCI, 
against all four measures of concentration. I show these regression results on Table 9. The 
variable is significantly multicolhear with both manufacturing and services share of GDP 
and urban population. Thus I dropped urbanization from the primacy and largest city's share 
of the population. However, I maintained sectoral specialization in the regression, as it is an 
absolutely essential variable. The results are again very consistent with the pattern found in 
the regressions using road and railway density as measures of public capital. Increasing fixed 
telephone hnes reduces population concentration in the largest city relative to other urban 
areas, and at the same time promotes population concentration from rural areas into urban 
areas. However, the results of these regressions are overall much stronger than in those 
using roads and railways. A one standard deviation increase in fixed telephone lmes reduces 
primacy by 23.44% percent of its standard deviation, and increases urbanization by 36.19% 
of its standard deviation. Both effects are statistically sipficant at the 1% level. 
Nevertheless, the most strllung aspect of these regressions is the fact that fixed 
telephone lmes actually increases the largest city share of the total population by about 12% 
of its standard deviation. This would mean that for the largest city, the concentration effect 
exceeds the Qspersion effect. In other words, the largest city would gain more population 
from unconnected rural areas than it would lose to connected urban areas. As a result, 
investments made in fixed telephone h e s  would exacerbate congestion problems in the 
primate city instead of alleviating them. However, there is an important reason why these 
results should be interpreted with caution. Fixed telephone h e s ,  unlike roads and railways, 
are measured per 100 people, not in kdometer density. It seems that measuring public capital 
by the coverage of network controls better for intracity infrastructure than measuring it in 
terms of percentage of the population. Tlvs is because, due to the greater Qstance between 
cities than within them, ITCI should have a greater weight on the network density measure 
than intracity infrastructure. When this is measured in terms of population, however, such 
effect dsappears. As a result, fixed telephone h e s  should have a greater endogeneity 
problem than the other two variables. Since there are more fuied telephone lmes in more 
populated areas than less populated ones, these results hkely overstate the concentration 
effect and understate the dispersion effect. 
As was the case with roads and railways, &IS discussion shows that each measure of 
ITCI has its own h ta t ions .  Therefore, regression results using of any one of them have to 
be interpreted prudently. It is, however, on the comparison of regression results using different 
measures of public capital that stronger conclusions can be drawn. And indeed, from such 
comparison, there is a clear convergence in some key aspects. First, all regression results 
show that public capital produces a sipficant dispersion effect from the largest urban area 
to other urban areas, and a sipficant concentration effect from rural areas into urban areas. 
Also, regression results using all three measures show that the population share of the largest 
city is reduced by less when compared to both connected urban areas and unconnected rural 
areas than when compared only to connected urban areas. In addition, the results show that 
public capital produces a greater increase in share of the population of secondary urban areas 
than in the largest city. T h s  supports the theoretical prediction that the dispersion and 
concentration effects have the same positive direction for secondary urban areas, whereas 
for the largest city the former effect has a negative drrection and the latter a positive one. 
The discrepancies of the regression results thus have more to do with the absolute and 
relative maptudes of the concentration and dispersion effects, not with their existence. 
6. Conclusion 
The purpose of this study is to examine and deepen our understanding of the effect 
of ITCI on urban concentration. The question has become of increasing importance in the 
economics geography literature, as policymakers seek to frnd solutions to the problem of 
excessive urban concentration, whlch occurs systematically across countries (Ades & 
Glaeser, 1995; Henderson 1999a, Henderson 2003). The costs of such inefficient population 
distribution are severe; as studies find that excessive concentration reduce economic growth 
rates sipficantly, up to 1.5 percentage points of GDP (Henderson, 1999a). For the past 
four decades, the consensus in urban economics has been that investment in interregonal 
transportation and communications infrastructure is the key policy instrument to solve ths  
problem. The reason is clear: ITCI reduces the cost of access to the market of the largest city 
for hinterland locations, thus m a h g  them more competitive. T h s  study also finds support 
for such dispersion effect, but points out that only considering such Qstribution 
phenomenon is an incomplete explanation for the effect of public capital on the population 
concentration. 
In a nutshell, the maln contribution of h s  study is a simple idea: economic agents in 
the largest city also benefit from the lower cost of transportation to the market of a smaller 
city. They benefit to a lesser extent than the smaller city to which it has been connected to, 
but they benefit nonetheless. Thus, when ITCI connects two locations, they become 
more desirable locations to do business. Because the increase in competitiveness is greater 
for the smaller city than the larger city, the relative competitiveness of the larger city falls 
with respect to the smaller city, whtch explains the move of firms and workers to the less 
populated city. However, the relative competitiveness of both increase with respect to all 
unconnected locations. T h s  explains why firms and workers move from those unconnected 
locations into the connected ones; the concentration effect. I use primacy and urbanization, 
two Qfferent measures of population concentration, to capture these effects. The dispersion 
effect is best captured with primacy because it compares the share of the largest urban area 
to smaller connected urban areas. The concentration effect is best captured with 
urbanization because it shows how the effect of public capital Qffers for urban and rural 
areas, whch Qffer in economes of scale and hence the cost-effectiveness of investments in 
public capital. If investment in public capital only had the effect of promoting Qspersion 
from more populated locations to less populated ones, the direction of the effect should be 
negative for both measures of concentration. The results of thls paper, however, show 
otherwise: investments in ITCI promote dispersion only amongst the locations it connects 
and induces concentration from the locations that are left unconnected into the connected 
ones. The implication of thls conclusion is a paradoxical one: a reduction in transportation 
costs can increase incentives for population concentration. T h s  is because it not only 
matters whether the costs are reduced; it also matters where they are reduced. 
The implications of not talung into account the concentration effect are severe. After 
all, if policymakers believe that investments in ITCI only promote population dspersion, 
they wdl continue to place such investments where it intuitively make sense: in very 
populated areas where there are large economies of scale. If reducing congestion to raise 
productivity is one of the goals of the investment, they wdl underacheve or even exacerbate 
the problem. Does thls imply that policymakers should not invest in ITCI as much? No. 
Instead, takmg the concentration effect into account means that investments in public capital 
need to connect a sufficient number of locations for the dispersion effect to be sigmficantly 
greater than the concentration effect. Indeed, in the extreme example of a public capital 
network in whch all locations were connected, there would be no concentration effect. 
However, that would not be desirable, as some level of concentration sigmficantly increases 
productivity (Henderson 1999a, Henderson 2003). Hence, depending on whether 
policymakers want to encourage or discourage concentration in a set of locations, they 
should connect more or fewer locations. Since the research in the urban economics literature 
documents that the problem tends to be excessive concentration, in general, policymakers 
should plan to connect more locations with public capital than they currently are. This is a 
relevant policy recommendation to current policy proposals, such as President Obama's 
proposed hgh-speed rail network in the United States, whch, not surprisingly, only connects 
the largest cities of broad land areas (US Department of Transportation, 2010). 
This paper also raises a set of new important questions for future research. For 
example, h s  paper uses urban areas as the group of locations with h g h  economies of scale 
and rural areas as the group of locations with low economies of scale. Such categorization is 
useful as an approximation, but there may be a better way to separate well-connected areas 
from less well-connected ones. This is especially true for case studes, in whch there may be 
more accurate data about the location of investments in public capital. Furthermore, the 
broad classification in itself of a network of connected locations may be further explored. As 
was mentioned in the robustness results using railway density, there may be drfferent types 
and structures of public capital networks that affect cities dfferently. Some types of ITCI 
networks may connect all locations fairly evenly, whereas others may provide an asymmetric 
number of connections to a city or a set of cities. Hence, it may not only matter whether a 
city is connected to a public capital network, but also its position in the network. For 
example, a city hke Paris, France, which is surrounded by a number of populated areas, may 
benefit more from its fairly central position in the network than a city like Berlin, whch is on 
a more peripheral region of Europe. 
Finally, the fact that a city's productivity depend in part of how it coordmates its 
connections with other cities raises an even deeper theoretical question related to game 
theory. For example, policymakers in a given city may want to push for public capital 
connections with more populated locations, in order to attract some of that economic 
activity into their city. However, the governments of larger cities may want to avoid such 
connections or only pursue them when the concentration effect exceeds the dspersion 
effect, in order to not lose economic activity. In addition, governments of drfferent cities 
may decide to connect their cities to increase their relative competitiveness with respect to 
cities in other regions. Since the prosperity in cities and regons depends in their 
coordmation with policymakers in other areas, there wdl be confltcts of interest. Thus, 
policymakers in lfferent areas will have to come to agreements so that mutually beneficial 
investments in ITCI are made. 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Primacy 
Urbanization 
Rail density 
Road density 
Fixed telephone lines 
GDP per capita 
Manu factwing 
& services share of GDP 
Government 
Openness 
Waterway density 
Land area 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Primacy 1144 28.64 13.85 3.47 61.98 
Urbanization 
Rail density 
Road density 
Fixed telephone lines 
GDP per capita 
Manufacturing 
& services share of GDP 
Government 1549 58.95 14.38 10.01 88.61 
Openness 1549 73.78 37.54 4.28 207.74 
Waterway density 957 0.02 0.03 0.00 0.18 
Land area 1735 1625596 4555919 2 27300000 
Table 3 - Summarv Statistics - Time Variation 
Variable Observations 
Primacy 1749 
Urbanization 1749 
Rail density 1048 
Road density 1575 
Fixed telephone lines 1749 
GDP per capita 1749 
Mean Std. Dev. 
0.92 
6.53 
0.00 
0.22 
5.73 
20.90 
Min 
30.04 
Max 
32.67 
Manufacturing 
& services share of GDP 
Government 
O~enness 
Table 4 - Total Variation (Logs) 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Log primacy 
Log urban concentration 
Log road density 
Log rail density 
Log lixed telephone lines 
Log GDPpc 
Log manufacturing 
& services share 946 4.39 0.22 3.21 4.60 
Log government 1205 4.03 0.36 1.27 4.60 
Log openness 1205 4.03 0.73 0.68 5.68 
Log waterways 688 -5.09 1.40 -9.98 -1.69 
Log land area 1291 11.72 3.02 0.69 17.13 
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Table 5 - Painvise Correlations 
Log Log Log Log Log Log Log Log 
road density rail density FTL GDPpc government openness waterways land area 
Log road 
density 1 
Log rail 
density 0.8263 1 
Log FTL 0.6288 0.5764 1 
Log GDPpc 0.5514 0.5106 0.8698 1 
Log 
government 0.044 -0.1428 -0.226 -0.41 43 1 
Log openness -0.0157 0.0576 0.1817 0.1724 -0.2381 1 
Log waterways 0.2397 0.2653 0.142 0.1613 -0.1172 0.1223 1 
Log land area -0.51 11 -0.5762 -0.2489 -0.2508 0.0795 -0.4646 -0.332 1 
Table 6 - Main Results - Adiusted Coefficients 
Variable Log primacy Log urbanization 
Log road density (t-1) -12.728 15.333 
(1 390) (3.56)"" 
Log manufacturing 
& services GDP share 
Log share of central 
government consumption (t-1) 
Log openness (t-1) 
Log waterway density 
Log land area 
Capital city dummy variable 
(1 if largest city is the capital) 
Log national urban population 
R-squared 0.28 0.59 
Observations 310 351 
Number of group (country) 64 8 1 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Log secondary Log largest city 
Variable urban areas population share 
Log road density (t-1) 25.624 -9.586 
(5.84)** (1.890) 
Log manufacturing 
& services GDP share 
Log share of central 
government consump tion (t- 1) 
Log openness (t-1) 
Log waterway density 
Log land area 
Capital city dummy variable 
(1 if largest city is the capital) 
(8.26)** 
R-squared 0.64 0.41 
Observations 310 310 
Number of group (country) 64 64 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Table 8 - Robustness Check 2- Adiusted Coefficients 
I% Log Log secondary Log largest city Variable primacy urbanization urban areas population share 
Log rail density (t-1) -28.380 9.273 8.935 -21.373 
(2.95)** (1.740) (1.680) (2.95)"" 
Log manufacturing 
& services GDP share -7.627 13.564 17.121 -5.744 
(1.780) (4.84)** (5.57)** (1.780) 
Log share of central 
government consumption (t-1) 7.326 -5.130 -15.015 5.518 
(1.450) (1.700) (4.07)** (1.450) 
Log openness (t-1) 4.029 5.331 4.505 3.034 
(1.520) (2.56)* (2.32)" (1.520) 
Log waterway density -30.629 1.342 6.033 -23.068 
(2.49)* (0.220) (1.110) (2.49)" 
Log land area -98.847 28.386 27.105 -74.444 
(3.42)** (2.17)* (1.99)* (3.42)** 
Capital city dummy variable 
(1 if largest city is the capital) 69.856 36.817 -3.035 52.610 
(2.25)* (2.53)* (0.220) (2.25)" 
Log national urban population -73.013 24.360 
Observations 205 229 205 310 
Number of group (country) 53 61 5 3 64 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Table 9 - Robustness Check 3 - Adjusted Coefficients 
< 
Log Log Log secondary Log largest city Variable primacy urbanization urban areas population share 
Log fixed telephone h e s  (t-1) -23.440 36.190 34.600 12.004 
(6.58)"" (15.37)** (14.63)"" (3.84)"" 
Log manufacturing & 
services GDP share 
Log share of central 
government consumption (t-1) -7.687 
(2.45)" 
Log openness (t-1) 5.616 
(2.10)" 
Log waterway density -30.394 
(2.72)"" 
Log land area -76.036 
(3.10)"" 
Capital city dummy variable 
(1 if largest city is the capital) 
Observations 430 510 430 430 
Number of group (country) 67 84 67 67 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in 
parentheses 
* Significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Table 10 - Main Results - Raw Coefficients 
Variable Log primacy Log urbanization 
Log road density (t-1) -0.052 0.066 
Log manufacturing 
& services GDP share 
Log share of central 
government consumption (t-1) 
Log openness (t-1) 
Log waterway density 
Log land area 
Capital city dummy variable 
(1 if largest city is the capital) 
Log national urban population 
Constant 
Observations 310 351 
Number of group (country) 64 8 1 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* sipficant  at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Table 11 - Robustness Check 1 - Raw Coefficients 
Log secondary Log largest city 
Variable urban areas population share 
Log road density (t-1) 0.139 -0.052 
Log manufacturing & 
services GDP share 
Log share of central 
government consumption (t-1) 
Log openness (t-1) 
Log waterway density 
Log land area 
Capital city dummy variable 
(1 if largest city is the capital) 
Constant 
R-squared 0.64 0.41 
Observations 310 310 
Number of group (country) 64 64 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Table 12 - Robustness Check 2 - Raw Coefficients 
LC% Log Log secondary Log largest city Variable primacy urbanization urban areas population share 
Log rail density (t-1) -0.122 0.042 0.051 -0.122 
(2.95)** (1.74) (1.68) (2.95)** 
Log manufacturing 
& services GDP share 
Log share of central 
government consump tion (t- 1) 
Log openness (t-1) 
Log waterway density 
Log land area 
Capital city dummy variable 
(1 if largest city is the capital) 
Log national urban population 
Constant 
(6.89)** (3.34)** (2.16)* (2.48)* 
R-squared 0.29 0.30 0.45 0.27 
Observations 205 229 205 205 
Number of group (country) 5 3 6 1 53 53 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
Table 13 - Robustness Check 3 - Raw Coefficients 
Variable primacy urbanization urban areas populatton share 
Log fixed telephone h e s  (t-1) -0.075 0.122 0.147 0.051 
(6.58)"" (15.37)"" (14.63)"" (3.84)"" 
Log manufacturing & services 
-0.147 GDP share 
Log share of central 
-0.128 government consumption (t-1) 
(2.45)" 
Log openness (t-1) 0.046 
(2.10)" 
Log waterway density -0.129 
(2.72)"" 
Log land area -0.15 
(3.10)"" 
Capital city dummy variable 0.244 0.072 -0.078 0.287 (1 if largest city is the capital) 
(1.48) (1.12) (0.98) (1.53) 
Constant 5.346 1.143 -0.46 1.74 
Observations 
Number of group (country) 67 84 67 67 
Notes: Absolute value of z statistics in parentheses 
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1% 
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